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I .  INTRODUCTION 
Making a better mousetrap has been one of the s tandard 
methods of achieving competitive advantages in American industries . 
Of course, making an equally good mousetrap with lower costs can 
be just as effective. To the extent that businesses compete with 
each other with product and process improvements , then one would 
expect inves tment in these activities (research and development 
[R&D]) to be a primary competitive tool. I t  is natural to ask which 
types of firms tend to engage heavily in R&D . A clearly related 
question one might ask is which market structures are conducive to 
R&D activity and which are not. In addition, it is important to 
remember that market s tructure itself may be affected by firms ' R&D 
activities--raising the question of R&D ' s  impact on market structure 
(see the related paper by Preston in this volume) . The most obvious 
situat ion in which market s tructure is affected by R&D activity is,  
of course, that of a monopoly position achieved and maintained by 
patents. This latter quest ion; that is,  essentially asking if market 
structure is really exogenous, is often not directly addressed in the 
literature. 
The purpose of this paper is to survey one portion of the 
so-called market structure literature, viz . , the empirical literature 
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dealing with the relation between market structure and the level of 
research and de:velopment activi ty. Weiss (1969) has surveyed the 
empirical literature in the entire field of industrial organization, 
and Kamien and Schwartz (1975) more recently surveyed the literature 
concerning innovative activity in general . In order to allow for an 
intensive examination of one body of literature, the scope of this 
paper has been kept narrow. Readers interested in o ther issues , for 
example, the rate of adoption or imitation and the diffusion of 
technological information, are referred to these other studies , 
There are two aspects of the literature which to a considerable 
extent dominate the discussion that follows . The first has to do with 
questions of causality. Thus, for example, in some papers a variable , 
such as expenditures on research and development ,  is treated as the 
dependent variable with quantities such as firm size, profitability, 
and so forth, as independent variables. Other writers, however ,  would 
consider the relationship the other way around. That i s ,  profi tability 
or sales growth might be the dependent variable with R&D among the 
independent variables. In rare instances , a writer might support both 
positions. Thus the literature clearly suggests that there is a 
simultaneous equations problem. The second feature noted was the 
seriousness of the problems of measurement. In many i f  not all fields 
of applications, one can find complaints about the quality of available 
data. Problems of aggregation, excessively long time periods between 
observations, insufficient degrees of freedom, and so forth are found 
in most areas , and industrial organization is no exception (Grabowski 
and Muf�ller 1970) . While those kinds o f  problems are serious , the 
3 
market structure innovation literature has in addition several more 
fundamental difficulties . For instance, are patent statistics a 
measure of inputs into the innovative process or a measure of the 
output of the process (Comanor and Scherer 1969)? Beyond questions 
as to the meaning of particular numbers, there are questions of how 
one could measure certain quanti ties, for example, the output of a 
firm' s  research department or the "size" of a technological break­
through. Those who do research in the area are quite aware of the 
simultaneity problem as well as the difficulties of measurement. 
These problems are often discussed explicitly and even when not, they 
affect the research methodology adopted; for example , use of rank 
correlations as opposed to the usual correlation coefficients . Also , 
these problems are not all unique to the s tructure-innovation literature, 
but to a considerable extent are features of the entire field of 
industrial organization. Thus , prior to discussing the literature on 
research and development, it seems worthwhile to provide a brief overview 
o.f market structure analysis and the associated problems of measurement .  
The plan o f  this paper i s  a s  follows : section II is intro­
ductory, containing a short description of the field as a whole. 
Research on some of the relevant measurement problems is discussed 
in Section III,  and the survey is given in section IV. 
II. MARKET STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
The basic idea in this literature is that there are relation­
ships running from market s tructure to firm behavior and therefore to 
the performance of the industry. As a practical matter most of the 
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literature is directed toward linking market structure and performance, 
performance being characterized by profit rates, price-cost margins, 
rate of technical progress, and so forth. One way of looking at the 
market structure literature is an attempt to determine a few (at least 
in principle) measurable variables which are sufficient for predicting 
the various aspects of industrial performance. 
While the list of variables that describe market structure 
varies somewhat from one application to another, certain variables 
are generally considered important. These are: concentration, 
barriers to entry, product differentiation, price and income elasticity 
of demand, and the extent of economies of scale in production. For a 
discussion of the importance of these and other variables, see Bain 
(1959). 
Concentration is generally measured by some feature of the 
size distribution of the firms in the industry in question. There is 
no general agreement on the appropriate definition of firm size; sales, 
assets, value added, and employment are all commonly used. However 
measured, the assumption is that if an industry is highly concentrated, 
i.e., is dominated by a small number of firms, price competition is 
less likely to prevail and nonprice competition and/or collusivelike 
behavior is likely to be more prevalent. 
'While a high level of concentration. is itself thought to be 
significant, frequently one asks if this can be explained on purely 
technological grounds. One wants to know if policies designed to 
lower concentration and thus, hopefully, increase competition, will 
incur offsetting costs in terms of losses of productive efficiency. 
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Also, if economies of scale are such that only a few firms could be 
expected to survive, then this fact might be used as an argument for 
some sort of regulatory policy. Thus the relation between the size 
of the overall market (measured in terms of output or sales) and the 
minimum efficient firm size (the smallest output at which average 
costs are at a minimum) is of considerable interest. The latter is 
estimated from analyzing cost and output data for the firms in the 
industries being studied. Note that if a firm must produce a substantial 
proportion of industry output in order to avoid a cost disadvantage, 
this may well discourage entry. Quite apart from the absolute size of 
the required investment, it is argued that the large relative size of 
the entering firm would lead to hostile reactions from the existing 
firms. 
A rapid rate of growth in the output of an industry is 
considered to be a force tending to lower concentration and to promote 
competitive behavior. The idea is that new firms may enter and small 
firms grow without provoking the retaliation that would occur if the 
sales of the new or growing firms led to an absolute reduction in 
sales by the larger firms in the industry. Also, with new buyers 
coming into the market, the results of secret price cutting may be 
harder to detect. Historical rates of increases in output and estimates 
of income elasticity of demand are thus relevant to the description of 
market structure. Similarly, estimates of the own-price elasticity 
can be useful as indicative of .the incentive to engage in price 
competition. 
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Product differentiation is important both as a possible 
deterrent to entry (heavy initial advertising outlays might discourage 
some potential entrants) and as an indl.cator of nonprice competition. 
While it is not clear how to measure the 11degree11 of product differen­
tiation, the ratio of expenditures on advertising to sales is 
frequently used. 
Finally, the conditions of entry are, as noted above, related 
to most of the other elements of market structure, In addition, other 
factors, for example, patents or the control of raw materials, could 
be important. Though entry conditions are of ten referred to as 11barriers 
to entry11 (the heights of which could presumably be measured), they are 
not usually quantified in any single index. However, frequently for 
efficient firm size and the overall size of the market determine 
concentration. 
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In some instances the direction of causation is generally 
agreed upon. It is widely assumed, for instance, that increasing 
concentration makes collusion easier and leads to higher profit rates, 
The theories that have been put forward to explain the level of 
concentration and much of the relevant work have been reviewed 
recently by Ornstein, Weston, Intriligator, and Shrieves (1973). 
They explicitly pointed out the interdependencies among many of the 
variables frequently used and suggested some alternatives. Possibly 
as a result of this interdependence, the interpretation placed upon 
the related empirical work seems to be largely descriptive. For 
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the market ,  or four or fewer companies have accounted for 80 percent
of sales" (p . 267). The primary remedy under their proposal was 
division or divestiture of assets thus directly lowering concentration 
and thereby improving the performance of the industry. 
One of the major questions examined in the market s tructure 
l iterature reviewed below is the following: what is the relationship 
between irnrentive activity and concentration? In other words , are 
there relevant systematic differences between firms in highly concentrated 
industries and firms in unconcentrated ones? If it is the case that 
concentration affects the level of inventive activity, the policy 
importance of this question is self-evident, Will a vigorous antitrust 
policy--pr.evention of mergers among sizable firms and the breaking up 
of the giants such as General Motors--have a positive or negative effect 
on the rate of technological progress and , thus , on the rate of growth 
of the American economy? On the other hand some, for example, Phillips 
(1966), have argued that the nature of the underlying technology and the 
results of research and development are what determine concentration. 
Thus it is not clear just how one should interpret a regression 
coefficient in a regression o f ,  say, R&D expenditures on :industry 
concentration ratios. To the extent that this is an equation from a 
simultaneous equations model such as that sketched above with regard 
to advertising, then ordinary least squares is not the appropriate 
method of estimation. Of course, without a more fully specified model , 
merely changing the estimation procedure cannot by itself be expected 
to lead to meaningful results . 
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III. MEASUREMENT 
In order to test hypotheses about the relationships between 
inventive activity and market s tructure, one needs measures of both 
types of variables, For the former the deficiencies of the measures 
used as well as problems involved in developing acceptable measures 
have been widely discussed (in particular, see Sanders 1962,  Kuznets 
1962 , Comanor and Scherer 1969, and Schmookler 1954a,b , 1957, 1962) . 
Most researchers have used either a measure of inputs into the 
research and development process (viz . , the rate of expenditure or 
the level of employment) or patents. The primary disadvantage of 
patent statistics is the obvious one: the substantial differences 
in the economic and technical importance of patented inventions . On 
the other hand, patent statistics are widely available, and a patent 
does s ignify a new and potentially useful device. 
Much of the difficulty with determining the input to or 
output from inventive activity is associated with trying to quantify 
these variables for a specific device or process .  Thus , there may 
have been several independent unsuccessful (and unreported) attempts 
to invent the same thing. Also, it may not be entirely clear how 
much previous effort was devoted to distinct but related proj ects. 
Similar considerations can make i t  difficult to determine the 
economic magnitude of an invention, that is, it may lead to numerous 
related inventions (or improvements), the existence of which may 
have been dependent upon the o�iginal invention, These types of 
problems are avoided in most of the papers surveyed since in these 
studies the relevant variable is the overall level of such activities 
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in a firm or industry rather than the amount associated with 
particular projects. 
As Kuznets (1962) has pointed out, properly measuring inputs 
in terms of man-hours or dollar expenditures is not easy. Part of the 
difficulty is that published data generally do not allow one to 
distinguish between basic research, applied research, and development 
work. In addition there is the usual problem of aggregating the 
efforts of individuals "endowed with different invent ive capacities. 11 
Using wage payments instead of man-hours may not be a fully satisfactory 
solution to the latter problem: "Considering the difficulty of estimating 
the economic contribution of inventive activity . • the assumption of 
marginal productivity would surely strain one�s credulity" (p.  33). 
Still, despite all these difficulties, it seems that it would be 
important if one could, using the market structure approach, explain 
the amount of resources devoted to industrial research and development . 
As discussed in the preceding section, market structure 
includes more than j ust concentration. In practice, however, some 
measure of concentration is frequently the only market structure 
variable employed. Most studies measure concentration by the standard 
four-firm concentration ratio defined as the percentage of the total 
sales of the industry accounted for by the largest four firms. Often 
employment or assets are used instead of sales, and frequently researchers 
will use more than one measure to insure that the results obtained are 
not simply an artifact of the measure chosen. In fact there are as 
many measures of concentration of this type as there are measures of 
firm size. As Shalit and Sankar (1977) note, no single measure of 
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firm size is completely appropriate. 
However one chooses to calculate the level of concentrat ion, 
there are a number of quite serious practical problems in using such 
variables. For example, the presence of some vertically integrated 
firm in an industry may make shipments the relevant variable rather 
than sales, and may make concentration levels computed using assets 
or employment be quite different from those computed using shipments 
as firm size. The SIC industries may not be entirely suitable so it 
may prove necessary to aggregate several concentration ratios (Kaysen 
and Turner 1959 ) ,  Kilpatrick (1976) has found that in practice there 
is little difference between averaging concentration ratios for several 
industries and computing directly the concentration ratio for the 
larger set o f  firms. The latter of course is a more appealing procedure 
(see Boyle 1973), Also, concentration ratios are computed on the basis 
of national figures whereas in many industries the markets may be 
geographically segmented. For a discussion of these and other related 
problems see Bain (1959) and Adelman (1951). 
Quite apart from questions of implementation there are the 
questions of what " concentration" is; that is, what is it that one 
wants to measure, and how at least in principle ought it to be 
measured? In fact it turns out that uconcentration" means different 
things to different people and not surprisingly a number of ways have 
been suggested to measure it. 
While concentration is expected to be related to the "level" 
of compet ition o r  the "degree" of competitiveness, it is not generally 
interpreted as an index of compet ition. Douglas (1969) provided a 
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temporary exception to this rule. In his paper Douglas argued that 
geographical dispersion, restrictive trade practices, contervailing 
power, "market divisionu (related to cross elasticities o.E supply 
among the several products produced by an industry), and problems 
associated with the Census industry definitions all lead to differences 
between the measured or "apparentu levels of concentration and the 
"real11 level by which he meant competitiveness . Douglas ' s  work was 
attacked by Nightingale (1970a,b) on a variety of grounds,  but mos t  
importantly o n  the interpretation of concentration. In his reply 
Douglas stated that after thinking it over he had changed his definition. 
"Whereas previously intended as an index of competitiveness, 'real 
concentration' now refers simply to the degree of seller concentration 
at a more meaningful level of disaggregation. . • From here it is 
plainly an additional step to an index of competitiveness , as the 
effect of restrictive practices, buyer concentration, further data 
problems , and possibly other factors as well, must be quantified and 
incorporated" (1970, p. 124) , So concentration is a characteristic of 
the size dis tribution of the f irms in an industry; however, it is not 
clear what characteristic is the appropriate one. 
The four-firm concentration ratio is the measure most 
frequently used in practice; in part this is due to its availability. 
Concentration ratios based on the largest eight , twenty, and fifty 
firms are also available. Miller (1967) suggested using "marginal 
concentration ratios" to explain profit rate. The idea is that rather 
than looking only at the share of the top k firms, one also could use 
the share of the kth through mth largest firms.. Given the various 
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published concentration ratios it is possible to compute some of 
the marginal concentration ratio s ,  for example 
MCRS , 8 CRB 
- CR4 
where CR. is the share of the i largest firms and MCRi . 
is the share 1 ,J 
o f  the ith to j th largest firms , Miller argued that rather than 
using CR4 alone as is usually done, it might often be better to use 
as much information as is available on the entire size distribution, 
Further, he advocated use of the marginal concentration ratios as a 
way around the problem of multicollinearity (CR4 and CR8 are much more 
highly correlated than CR4 and MCR5 , 8) .  Suppose one has a model in
which the profit rate is determined by CR4 and CR8 : 
TI. 
1 
a + bCR4 + cCR8 + u. i i l 
a +  (b + c) CR4_ 
+ c (CRS . 1 1 
CR4 ) + ui i 
a +  (b + c)CR4. 
+ cMCR5 , 8_ 
+ ui . 
1 1 
Now if CR4 and CR8 are nearly collinear, then estimates of b and c may 
not pass standard significance tests. If the regression is estimated 
using MCR5 , 8 instead of CR8 , the estimated coefficients of MCRS ,S and 
CR8 will be identical as will their s tandard errors (apart from roundoff 
errors) . It could happen that the coefficient of CR4 will become 
significant , but by the standard properties of least squares regression 
this is simply the sum of the estimated coefficients of CR4 and CR8 , 
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i . e . , b + c .  Thus the two approaches are equivalent, and changing 
to MCR adds no new information. 
Miller noted that in principle the entire size distribution 
is relevant and considered a model of the form 
TI i a +  blCR4. + 
b 2MCR5 , 8 i  
+ h3MCR9 , 20 i  + 
b4MCR2 1 , 50i
i 
+ b5MCR5 1 ,oo i + u i . 
He correctly observed that there is an identification problem since the 
explanatory variables add to a constant (100) . Eliminating the share 
of the smallest firms he estimated 
TI i a +  100b 5 + (bl 
- b 5)cR4_ 
+ (b 2 -· b 5)MCRS ,Si 
l 
+ (b 3 
- bs)MCR9 , 20i + (b 4 - bs
)MCR21 ,50 i  + 01· 
Of course, it does not matter which variable is dropped , the results 
obtained will be equivalent.  That is , if CR4 is dropped , one will
obtain estimates of a +  100b1 , b2 - b1 , b3 - b1 , b4 - b1 , and b5 
- b1 , 
from which Miller's estimates could be deduced . Miller apparently did 
not recognize this and reported that equations 1' including (100 - CR ) 
so 
(but excluding each of the other marginal concentration ratios in turn) 
produced results withou t sensible economic interpretation'1 (1967,  p .  267) . 
The usefulness of marginal concentration ratios has been 
dispu ted by Collins and Pres ton (1969) . They noted that by definition 
MCR5 8 cannot exceed CR4 , and that if cR4 exceeds 5 0 ,  then MCR5 8 mus t' . 
be less than or equal to 100 - CR4 . In order to eliminate the range 
restrictions, Weiss suggested using 
v MCR CR 
MCR 
1 - CR/100 
CR < 50 
CR > 50.  
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Weiss reported regressions estimated using the data of Collins and 
Preston with V replacing MCR5 8• It turned out 
that the estimated 
• 
coefficient of V had a positive sign but was less than its standard 
error, leading Weiss to conclude that uMCR has little effect one way 
or another1' (1969 , p .  373) . 
Usually one interprets regression coefficients as being 
estimates of partial derivatives. That is , one is attempting to 
answer the question, "If x goes up by one, other things being equal , 
by how much will y change on average?" Now when the independent 
variables must sum to a constant, this question is meaningless; one 
mus t  specify the changes in the other variables. As Collins and 
Preston in effect pointed out, omitting the share of the smallest 
firms from the es timated regression does not eliminate this problem. 
Neither, of course, can resorting to variables such as V .  For example, 
Weiss regressed price-cost margins on CR4 , V ,  plus some other variables . 
Since the value of V is not constrained by the valu e of CR4 , one can 
ask about the effects of unit changes in CR4 or V (ceteris 
paribus); 
however, the interpretation o.f these changes depends crucially on the 
value of CR4 . Notice that if CR4 is larger than 50, V has a relatively 
straightforward interpretation, namely the level of concentration 
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among the smaller firms in the industry. 
TheJ::-e are a number of other measures of concentration in 
addition to marginal concentration ratios that use information about 
the entire size distribution of the firms in th�� industry. Three of 
these are related to entropy H .  
H 
n - l s .  log si i=l l 
where n is the number of firms in the industry and s1 is the share of
sales (employment, etc. ) accounted for by the ith firm, and the 
logarithms are usually base 2. If si is taken as the probability that
a dollar of sales goes to the ith firm, then H may be interpreted as 
the amount of information obtained in learning which firm made the 
sale (Theil 1967, Khinchin 1957). For a given n, H attains its 
maximum (log n) when all firms are of equal size suggesting the use 
of "relative entropy" defined as 
G H log n" 
Another entropy related measure is F the "numbers equivalent" (Horowitz 
1971) defined by 
H log F .  
Suppose that for some particular industry, entropy is calculated t o  be 
H, then F is the number of equal-sized firms wh:lch would result in an 
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entropy of H. Miller (1972) used G, F, and CR4 to explain profit
rates for twenty-five, four-digit industries. In all of his 
regressions, G was significant with a positive coefficient and F 
insignificant . CR4 appeared to be significant in regressions which 
also contained G, and was insignificant otherwise. Miller concluded 
that F, G, and CR4 "reflected different aspects of market structure, "
but unfortunately , was not able to provide any clear interpretation 
for G, the one measure which consistently performed well in his 
regressions. The difficulty concerned comparing G ' s  computed for 
industries with different numbers of firms . 
Exactly the same difficulty arises in using the Gini coefficient. 
This coefficient which is a measure of the inequality in a size distri-
bution is defined as the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45 degree
line corresponding to cases in which all firms are of equal size. It 
can be shown (Kendall 1943) that the Gini coefficient g is equal to : 
g 
1/2 H l xi - x .  Ii j J 
2_ n x 
where x1 is the size of the ith firm and X is the average firm size.
Hart and Prais (1956) suggested an interesting interpretation for the 
Gini coefficient. "Suppose the difference in the size of two firms 
provides a measure of the degree of ' dominance' that the one may exert 
over the other's price or output policy . • • •  Then a measure of 
dominance for an industry as a wh9le may be found by taking the mean 
difference, irrespective of sign, between all possible pairs of firms .  
• • . The Gini coefficient can therefore b e  interpreted as a measure 
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of average dominance in the group of firms considered" (1956, 
pp. 152-153). As Adelman (1959) has pointed out, the Gini coefficient 
by itself is not of much use for comparing industries with different 
numbers of firms as, for instance, it does not differentiate between 
an industry with two equal-sized firms and one with a thousand firms 
all of the same size. 
There have been two rather similar attempts to obtain 
measures of concentration using an axiomatic approach (Hall and 
Tideman 1967 and Niehans 1958). Hall and Tideman posited six criteria 
that a measure of concentration should satisfy: 
(1) It should be a single number. 
(2) It should depend upon all the market shares. 
(3) It should increase whenever there is a shift from a smaller to 
a larger firm. 
(4) If each firm in an industry is divided into K equal ones, the 
measure should change by a factor of l/K. 
(5) It should be a decreasing function of N when an industry is 
divided into N equal firms. 
(6) It should range between 0 and 1. 
Of the six properties it seems likely that most would find 
numbers 2, 3, and 5 unobjectionable in principle. Adelman (1951), 
however, argued that as a practical matter using the full size 
distribution is risky since this makes the measures sensitive to the 
often arbitrary industrial classifications of numerous small firms. 
Properties 4 and 6 are clearly ad hoc and serve primarily to narrow 
19 
down the list of possible candidates. Hall and Tideman considered 
indices based upon 
R 
n 
I isi i•l 
where s1 is the share of the firm with rank i, so that if s1 is the 
probability that a random dollar of sales goes to the firm with rank i, 
R is the expected rank. The index they suggested is: 
TH 1 
n 
2 I is
i - i i=l 
Property 6 led them to consider functions of 1/R, the exact form being 
chosen to satisfy property 4. Hall and Tideman noted that a large 
number of indices could satisfy their criteria and that one other 
popular index, the Herfindahl index HH (which will be discussed presently}, 
does so. They reported that empirically both measures as well as CR4 
turn out to give essentially the same rankings of concentration. They 
concluded that if "HH or TH is the correct measure of concentration, 
then the concentration ratio is certainly a good proxy" (1967, p. 168). 
Niehans (1958) was concerned with developing an index of 
average firm size rather than relative concentration, so he did not 
adopt property 6 .  He set down four criteria: 
(1) Same as 1 above, 
(2) If all firms in an industry are the same size, then the index 
should equal that size. 
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(3) Same as 2 above. 
(4) If a large or· "medium-sized" firm grows , other firms staying 
the same size, then the index should rise, and if a small firm 
grows , ceteris paribus it should fall . 
The index proposed by Niehaus is 
y 
n 
I xi8i 
i=l 
2 
<J -�+ x ,x 
where x1 is the size of the ith firm and s1 its share of the industry ' s
total sales o r  employment, X i s  the average firm size, and o2 i s  the 
variance of firm size (Hart 1961). Thus Niehans ' s  index is larger 
than the average firm size unless all the firms are equal . 
One other commonly used measure of concentration is the 
Herfindahl index: 
HR 
n 2 I 8i' i=l 
where si is the share of the ith firm. Again if si is interpreted
as the probability of the ith f irm obtaining a given dollar of sales , 
then HH is the expected value of that probability. Stigler (1964) 
has argued that HH is the appropriate measure of concentration in 
that it is related in a simple fashion to the ease with which firms 
can detect secret price cutting or cheating on a collusive agreement. 
In Stigler ' s  theory firms use classical hypothesis-testing rules and 
decide that secret price cutting is going on whenever actual sales fall 
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below expected sales by a predetermined number of standard deviations , 
For example, suppose that in each period, n0 , new customers enter the 
market and 11let the probability of attracting a customer be proportional 
to the firm's share of industry output, s .  Then the variance of the 
firm ' s  sales to new customers will be n0s(l - s) , and the aggregate
for the industry will be 
c 
n 
n I s (1 - s) 0i-1 
for n f irms" (Stigler 1964, p .  55). Note that C - nn (1 - HH) , 
More recently Dansby and Willig (1979) and Hause (1977) 
have presented theoretical justification for HH. Dansby and Willig 
derive RH and other indices from welfare maximizing criteria (maximizing 
consumer surplus) . Hause argues that HH should be a lower bound for 
"reasonable" indices of concentration that. range from zero for 
competition to one for monopoly. Hause, like other writers , assumes 
the cardinality of concentration without questioning it . As 
Schmalensee (1977) points out, generally one cannot compute HH as 
its computation requires the full size distribution. Schmalensee 
reports tests of a number of computible alternatives to HH. 
Unfortunately, which surrogate works best seems to depend upon the 
level of concentration as measured by HH. It does appear that the 
standard four-firm concentration ratio is superior (as an approximation 
to HH) to using one based upon the eight largest firms . 
As with the entropy measures, the Herfindahl index can also 
be converted to a numbers equivalent, Thus , if an industry consists 
of n equal size firms , 
HH 
n 
I <11nl2 
i=l 
2 2  
l/n; 
so the reciprocal of HR has an interpretation similar to F discussed
previously. 
As mentioned earlier the concentration ratio CR4 is the
most conunonly used measure. In part this is due to the fact that 
these figures are readily available , but an additional advantage 
is that it is more easily interpreted (at least understood) than 
the entropy measures or the other indices. In other words , to say 
that the top four firms in one industry produce x percent of the 
industry1s output, whereas ten years earlier the top four produced 
y percent is a reasonably concrete statement whether or not its 
implications are entirely clear . Similar statements in terms of H ,  
HH, TH, G ,  etc. are not so readily understood. These difficulties in 
interpretation provide much of the motivation behind the use of 
numbers equivalents (Horowitz 1971, Adelman 1959) as these measures 
are expressed in units that are on the surface at least more familiar. 
In addition to their uses in comparing the levels of 
concentration among different industries, the various measures of 
concentration are also used in time series studies to determine if 
there are any discernible trends in concentration (Bain 1970) . The 
study of changing concentration over time has led to another entirely 
dif_ferent class of measures based upon mobility (see for example, 
Collins and Preston 1969 , Boyle and Sorenson 1971) . Suppose the firms 
2 3  
in an industry are ranked according to some measure of size, The 
idea behind the mobility measures is roughly as follows : if there 
is intense rivalry within an industry, this should be reflected in 
changes in the rank orders as different firms gain and lose relative 
to the competition. Conversely, if there is little competition, one 
expects the rankings to be relatively stable. These considerations 
lead to measures of mobility such as rank correlations . The important 
thing to note here is that concentration or 11competitiveness" measures 
based upon mobility could lead to orderings of industries that are 
quite different from those obtained using the other types of measures. 
The measures described previously either ignore rankings of the firms 
or weight them by firm size. 
Each of the proposed measures of concentration is based upon 
some feature of the size distribution of a particular group of firms . 
Now in general one canno t expect to be able to summarize arbitrary 
frequency distributions with a single index. In fact there have been 
a number of empirical and theoretical studies of firm size distributions 
(Adelman 1951, Hart 1957,  Mansfield 1962,  Simon and Bonini 1958; see 
also Kalecki 1945, and Champernowne 1953). These s tudies generally deal 
with distributions that would arise if Gibrat ' s  Law or the law of 
proportionate effect held, the key assumption being that the probability 
of a given percentage change in a firm ' s  size is independent of the size 
of the firm. It has been well known for some time that this assumption 
will yield a skewed size distribution (the precise dis tribution depends 
upon the assumptions made about exit and entry) . Clearly if a parametric 
representation of firm size distributions (or the upper tail of these 
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distributions) were known , it would have implications for measurement 
of concentration. Since concentration is simply a charac teristic of 
the size distribution, it would be reasonable to use measures 
expressible in terms of the parameters of this distribution. Alterna­
tively, representations of the parameters themselves might be used as 
explanatory variables. For example, Aitchison and Brown (1957) and 
Hart and Prais (1956) suggested using the s tandard deviation of the 
log normal distribution, and Simon and Bonini (1958) who derived a Yule 
distribution for firm size recommended the percentage of growth 
accounted for by new f irms. For criticisms and defenses of these 
sorts of measures ,  see Adelman (1951, 1959), and Hart (1961). 
ln sunrrnary, there are a substantial number of ways that 
have been suggested to measure concentration (the preceding list is 
not a complete one) . A few have some theoretical support ,  but most 
are simply empirically based. In addition to several quite different 
kinds of measures even within a given class of measures , there does 
not appear to be any consensus as to what foirm of the measure should 
be used, for example, entropy, relative entropy, or numbers equivalent 
(antilog of entropy). Studies comparing various measures do not seem 
to have produced a clear winner by any criteria. Fortunately, many 
of the measures tend to be highly correlated with each other so 
possibly the exac t choice does not really matter a great deal. See 
for example, Kilpatrick (1967) or Bailey and Boyle (1971). Nevertheless, 
the various measures are far from identical so that the quantitative 
results obtained from a statistical analysis will depend to some degree 
upon the measure chosen. 
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In general it does not seem possible to make any very useful 
statement about the effects on estimated regression coefficients of 
the use of an " incorrect11 index of concentration. For example, 
consider the following model: 
Yi a + Sxi + yzi + u1 
where xi and zi are exogenous variables and ui is the random error 
term. Suppose that data are available on y1 and xi but zi is unobserved.
What is observed, however, is pi -- a proxy for zi , For instance, z1 
might be the output of a research department, firm size, or market 
power and p i could be the number of patents applied for or new products
introduced; the total of sales, assets, or employment; or some measure 
of concentration. Clearly, using p instead of z will lead to estimates 
that do not have the usual least squares properties (unbiasednes s ,  
consistency, and s o  on) . 
McCallum (1972) and Wickens (1972) have considered the 
following question: when is the estimate of S obtained from a 
regression including p closer to B (in the sense of plim !B - Si) than 
the estimate obtained using only data on y and x. What they showed is 
that if 
p
i 
z
i + vi 
where vi is uncorrelated with the o ther variables in the model, then 
use of the proxy variable will always give a 11better" estimate of B. 
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Since the result does not depend upon the relative variances o f  z 
and v, even a very poor proxy, that is, one with a low correlation 
with z, is better than none at all. To the extent that the dis­
crepancy between p and z is due to sampling error, this result 
should be applicable. In the applications considered here, however, 
the differences between the desired variable and the various variables 
used to represent them can hardly be ascribed to sampling error. 
What happens, presumably, is that one p icks a variable which i s ,  
hopefully, highly correlated with the correct one and introduces i t  
into the regression equation in order t o  control for variations in 
the unobserved variable. Needless to say, this procedure could lead 
to either improved or worse estimates of 8. 
In the measurement error case, the correlations between the 
proxy variable and the other variables in the model are smaller in 
absolute value but have the same sign as the correlations between the 
correct variable and the other variables. Assuming without loss of 
generality that p and z are positively correlated , then if  this same 
condition is satisfied, and the correlation between z and the proxy p 
is moderately large, that is, corr(p , z) > corr(x,p) corr(x,z), where 
corr(x,z) I 0 ,  then the estimate obtained using the proxy will be 
"closer" to S than that obtained without it.  Thus , provided the proxy 
is sufficiently highly correlated with the true variable, behaves 
at least qualitatively like it, and does not make the multicollinearity 
problem worse, using the proxy will improve the estimate of S. While 
these kinds of assumptions may not seem unreasonable, they need not 
hold, as for instance, the relation, "is positively correlated with," 
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is not generally transitive. Of course, even if these conditions 
are satisfied, the resulting estimates will not have the usual 
desirable properties . In summary, the substantial difficulties of 
measurement combined with the s imultaneous equations problems mean 
that many results obtained by least squares regression methods 
should be interpreted with caution. 
IV. MARKET STRUCTURE AND R&D 
The empirical papers discussed in this section deal with 
the relationships between various features of f irms, market structure 
(concentration), and innovative activity. All these studies could 
have import.ant consequences for pol icy (in particular, antitrust 
policy) though the papers do not necessarily directly discuss these 
policies . The first group of papers covered contains information of 
the role of product diversification in research and thus is primarily 
of interest with respect to the question of conglomerate bignes s .  The 
second group of results to be surveyed deals with the relation between 
firm size and the level of research activity . Considerable work has 
been devoted to determining if research intensity (R&D activity per 
unit of size) is an increasing function of firm size. Finally, the 
relation between concentration and research activity measured at the 
industry level is examined . Thus, it is hoped that these studies 
should provide some insight into the following kinds of questions: 
Who innovates? That is, what ar� the characteristics of the most 
innovative firms? To what extent are there economies of scale to R&D? 
Is market s tructure analysis a useful tool in studying innovative 
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activity? Does it appear, for example, that certain types of market 
structures are relatively more conducive to the creation or adoption 
of new technologies? 
Diversification 
The relationship to be considered here is that between 
research activity and diversity. In his survey Weiss (1969, pp. 393-94) 
said, "I judge that the issue is unsettled and a good candidate for 
more work, especially in view of its potential relevance to the 
conglomerate merger debate." There are three studies bearing on this 
issue: Grabowski (1968, diversification has a positive effect), Scherer 
(1965c, no systematic effect), and Comanor (1965, a negative effect). 
Weiss concluded that he "can reconcile Scherer with either Grabowski 
or Comanor but not with both." 
Grabowski analyzed data on firms in the chemical, drug, and 
petroleum industry for the period 1959-1962. The basic model he 
estimated is the following: 
where 
R
it 
8it 
Rit" 
s
it 
pi 
a + bP i + 
1
i t-1 c --' -Sit 
+ dDi + eit 
R&D expenditures in year t. 
sales in year t. 
number of patents received per scientist and 
engineer employed during the previous four years. 
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I i,t-1 after tax profits plus depreciation and depletion 
in year t - 1. 
Di the number of five-digit SIC products produced. 
The equation was estimated by least squares separately for each industry. 
The specification is somewhat similar to Hamberg's (1966) in that the 
role of internal finance is ex plicitly allowed for. Note the direction 
of causation assumed here -- research inputs depending upon the results 
of previous research and development activity. In all three regressions 
the estimates of d were positive and in two cases, chemicals (t-ratio 
4.8) and drugs (t = 5.8) highly significant. 
Scherer (196Sa,b,c) used the same sort of index of diversity. The 
447 SIC four-digit classification was reduced to 200 "technologically 
meaningful" industries, and diversification was measured by counting 
the number of these in which a firm operated. Scherer worked with data 
on 448 finns from the Fortune 500, and reported that the diversification 
variable was significant in regressions of R&D employment on sales, 
patents on R&D employment, and patents per billion dollars of sales 
on sales. However, when the sample was divided into two-digit SIC 
industries, "diversification played an uneven role." Generally its 
coefficient was significant and positive in regressions explaining 
patents or R&D employment only for the less technologically progressive 
industries. For the more research oriented industries the coefficients 
were generally insignificant (even.negative in regressions explaining 
patents). Thus diversification does not appear to have a strong 
systematic effect on either R&D inputs or patents. Scherer explained 
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these results as being at least to some extent an artifact of the 
measure of diversity chosen. Consider a firm operating primarily 
in a low research industry. The higher the measure of diversity 
the greater the chance that the firm will have a division in a more 
research oriented industry. 
Comanor (1965) had data on 57 drug firms (accounting for 
80 percent of industry sales) and fit a rather elaborate model : 
where 
Y i 
S i 
Y i 
Si 
RD. 1 
Di 
a +  
RD 
b .i. S i 
2 (RDi) 
+ c s-. 1 
+ dSi + eRDi Si + fDi + 
ei 
sales during the first two years of all new chemical 
entities introduced during the period 1955-1960. 
average sales over the period 1955-1960. 
number of professional persons employed in research 
(average of 1955 and 1960 figures) . 
index of diversity defined as follows : 
Let Dlt = number of markets in which a firm operates that
account for at least 2 percent of its sales in year t .  
market. 
Let n2t = proportion of sales outside of its "primary" 
Then 
1960 
D = l/6 I Dl D2t . t=l955 t 
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For the purpose of constructing these indices , forty submarkets 
were identified. 
Comanor also had data on the number of nonprofessional 
research and development workers and the model was reestimated 
using total R&D employment .  Further, both specifications were 
rerun with y redefined as sales from all new products as opposed to 
just new chemical entities. In all four regressions , the coefficient 
of diversity was negative and significantly so in three of them. 
Notice that the direction of causation assumed by Comanor 
is the opposite of that assumed by Grabowski. Even if Comanor ' s  
specification is the correct one, there still remains a simultaneous 
equations problem here due to the dating of the variables in the 
regression. In particular, consider the index of diversity. I t  is 
quite possible that a successful research program could lead to a 
reduction in diversity as defined by Comanor, and the greater the 
success the greater the drop in diversity. This objection would not 
hold if diversity had been measured as of the beginning of the period 
rather than averaged over it.  
Comanor also considered the possibility that the direction 
of causation may be opposite from what he had assumed, He argued 
that it could be that the successful introduction of new products 
generates funds used internally to expand research staffs, and thereby 
to diversify. He noted that if this latter specification is correct, 
then the timing can be revers�d from that posited in his model . He 
did not formulate and estimate the alternative model , but instead 
he estimated his equations using alternative lag schemes . He found 
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that regression equations of new product sales on future R&D inputs 
are inferior to equations using past R&D employment .  I n  these latter 
regressions new product sales (1958-1960) are explained by diversity 
based on 1955-195 7 ,  and as before the coefficients are negative and 
significant. Thus for these regressions the objection about the dating 
does not hold. Note, however, that for some reason the same measure 
of firm size (aver.age sales over the whole period) is also used in 
these regressions. 
Size 
There have been a number of studies which bear on the 
relationships between firm size and research activity. Generally , 
in these s tudies the level of R&D is measured by inputs,  either employ­
ment or expenditures. Comanor' s work mentioned above is an exception 
in that he did have an indicator of output. Also , both Schmookler 
(1954a,b) and Scherer (1965a,b , c) have worked �·ith patent statistics. 
While one tends to think of patents as an output of the research proces s ,  
Comanor and Scherer (1969) concluded that at least for the pharmaceutical 
industry, patents may be a better measure of input. They reported the 
results of correlating series on patent applications and patents issued 
with both of the dependent variables used in Comanor ' s  study as well 
as with both Comanor ' s  measures of R&D inputs (professional and total 
employment in research ) .  Simple correlations were positive and 
statistically significant as were the partial correlations computed 
controlling for firm size. Generally the correlations were higher 
between patents and employment than between patents and new product sales. 
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Each of the three papers discussed above with respect to 
diversity contains statistical evidence on the firm size-research 
question. Grabowski (1968) reports the results of regressing R&D 
expenditures on sales and sales squared for his samples of firms 
in the drug and chemical industries. In both cases the coefficients 
of the linear and quadratic terms are significant with the coefficients 
of sales being positive . The quadratic term is positive for the 
chemical industry and negative for drugs . Thus research intensity 
(R&D expenditures per dollar of sales) increases with firm size in the 
chemical industry and rises at first and then falls as sales are 
increased for firms in the drug industry. Grabowski qualified his 
results noting that the measure of size is total sales rather than 
just sales in the product line associated with the research effort. 
This raises essentially the same point that Scherer made about the 
interpretation of his measure of diversity. Grabowski specifically 
pointed out that large drug firms do diversify into other areas . 
Indeed the correlations between sales and the diversity index are 
positive for both industries ( 0 . 8  for chemicals and 0 . 2  for drugs ) . 
Scherer (1965c) estimated various relations between patents 
issued in 1959 and sales and employment in R&D in 1955 for his sample 
of 448 large manufacturing firms. For the entire sample he found a 
significant positive effect of firm size (sales) on patent s .  There 
appeared to be significant differences in the propensity to patent 
between industries (splitting the sample into 14 two- and three-digit 
industries roughly doubled the explanatory power) . Though the 
estimated magnitudes of the coefficients and their significance levels 
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varied a good deal across industries, all the results with the exception 
of textiles indicated a positive association between sales and patents. 
Scherer also estimated regressions of patents issued on sales, 
sales squared, and sales cubed (the coefficient estimates were positive, 
negative, and positive, respectively). He found diminishing returns 
to sales up $5. 5 billion (which included all but three firms in his 
sample) . The sample was divided into four subsamples (electrical , 
chemical, moderately progressive, and unprogressive) and the same 
regression run for each group with substantially similar results. In 
order to give less weight to the giant firms in the sample,  cubic 
equations using the logarithms of sales were estimated. Diminishing 
returns were again apparent for the chemical and electrical groups , 
but less so for the others. Each industry grouping was further sub-
divided into size classes and separate regressions estimated for each. 
The results indicated increasing returns up to sales of $500 million 
for chemicals and electrical s ,  slight decreasing returns generally for 
the moderately progressive group , and no discernible pattern for the 
unprogress:l.ves. 
Comanor (1965) also included a measure of firm size in his 
regressions , though given the complexity of the estimated equation, its 
interpretation is difficult without access to the data. The coefficient 
of size is given by 
a +  dS. + eRD • S + 1 
(+) (+) (-) 
fDi' 
(-) 
(The signs of the estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses .)  
and the coefficient of R&D input by 
b + cRD + eS.  
(-)  (+) (-) 
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Comanor estimated the elasticity o f  new produ£t sales with respect 
to R&D input for firms with sales of 1 ,  10, and 50 million dollars , 
the elasticity estimates being 1 . 4 ,  0 . 6 ,  and 0 . 5 ,  respectively. 
Worley (1961) and Hamberg (1964, and 1966 Chapter 4 )  report 
in rather similar studies on the relation between firm size and R&D. 
Worley regressed the logarithm of the number of R&D personnel on the 
logarithm of firm size measured by total employment for a sample of 
198 large firms in eight, two-digit industries. The data referred 
to 1955.  In six out of eight cases ( chemicals and allied products , 
petroleum and petroleum product s ,  stone, clay, and glass products,  
nonelectrical machinery, electrical machinery, and transportation 
equipment) the estimated coefficient exceeded unity, being less than 
one only for food and kindred products and primary metals . The average 
of the estimates was slightly greater than one ( 1 . 08) . The estimate 
was significantly greater than one at the 5 percent level only for 
petroleum and at the 10 percent level for electrical machinery, and 
none of the remaining estimates was significantly larger than unity 
at conventional levels. Of the two point estimates which were less 
than one, neither was significantly so.  Worley came out against the 
hypothesis that size is a stimulus to research though he was appro-
priately cautious : "One cannot assert that the evidence offered 
here • . .  nullifies the case for bigness" (Worley 1961, p. 186) . 
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Hamberg computed correlation coefficients and rank correlations 
between R&D employment and firm size measured alternatively by total 
employment and book value of assets for seventeen manufacturing industries 
in 1960. Of the sixty-eight estimates, all but one were positive and 
nearly all the rest significantly so at a 5 percent level . To test the 
hypothesis that an increase in firm size is associated with a more than 
proportionate increase in R&D, Hamberg computed rank correlations b etween 
R&D intensity (percentage of employees in R&D) and both measures of firm 
size. The results of this experiment were more mixed ( twenty-three of 
thirty-four estimates were positive but most not significantly so ) .  
Hamberg also ran double logarithmic regressions between R&D intensity 
and firm size. Using employment as size, twelve of the seventeen 
coefficients were greater than one with three passing at the , 05 level 
(one estimate is significantly less than one) . When firm size is measured 
by total assets, only ten are larger than one, though four others are 
larger than 0. 9 8 .  In this case, while one coefficient (primary metals) 
is again less than one ( . 05) only two coefficients appear to be signifi­
cantly greater. Hamberg concludes that "the case for bigness and fewness 
as a stimulus to industry appear s ,  on the basis of fairly extensive 
evidence ,  to be quite weak11 (1966, p .  68) . 
Scherer (1965b) commented on the work of Hamberg and Worley. 
He noted that if their elasticity estimates were mutually independent, 
then the evidence they presented, if anything, would support the case 
for corporate bigness .  He also pointed out that many firms (especially 
small ones) do no R&D at all, but that Hamberg ' s  sample did not include 
any such firms. Further, since both Hamberg and Worley used the 
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logarithm of R&D input as the dependent variable in their regression 
equations, how to handle the zero observations is no small problem. 
He went on to demonstrate empirically that the estimates can be made 
greater or less than one by adopting various conventions for handling 
the zeros. For his sample (the same as used in Scherer 1965a) 
ignoring the zero observations gave estimates less than one, while 
replacing the zeros with a small positive number gave estimates greater 
than one. Regardless of the conventions adopted for handling the zeros, 
the measure of firm size used also affected the results. Measuring 
firm size by employment gave estimates that were the most favorable to 
bignes s ,  while estimates based upon sales as the definition of firm 
size were less favorable , and those using total assets were the least 
favorable. Thus, Scherer showed that the statistical results obtained 
by Hamberg and Worley were quite sensitive to both the definitions of 
firm size and the treatment of firms which did not engage in R&D. 
For his sample Scherer estimated regressions with R&D employ­
ment explained by cubic equations in sales and the logarithm of sales 
The results obtained were similar to those he obtained for patents. 
With the exception of the chemical industry and a small number of 
giant firms, his estimates indicated that R&D intensity was a decreasing 
function of firm s ize for firms with sales in excess of $500 million, 
Hamberg (1966,  Chapter 6) studied the effects of various 
characteristics of firms on the number of R&D personnel employed. His 
sample consisted of 405 large firms for the year 1960. 
Hamberg argued that the size of the R&D effort should be 
related to the total sales of the firm. He felt that R&D should be 
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positively related to sales, but that a negative relationship was 
possible as "a shrinkage of sales , or perhaps a retardation in their 
growth, could be a signal to increase R&D spending" (p. 117). Profits 
were also considered as a possibly important variable, and as with sales 
it was argued that the sign of the regression coefficient could 
plausibly be either positive or negative. To the extent that internal 
finance is important for R&D, Hamberg felt that depreciation. expenses 
could be significant. He felt that the sign of this variable should 
be positive, but that a negative coefficient would not be unacceptable. 
The level of government R&D contracts held by the firm was also included 
as an explanatory variable. Hamberg argued that in general one would 
expect the s ign of the regression coefficient for this variable to be 
positive. The coefficient could be negative he argued, as a shortage 
of scientific personnel could lead a firm to reduce its own R&D effort 
as a result of increased government contrac ts. The level of gross 
investment in plant and equipment was included in the equation with 
the expec tation of a negative sign (R&D expenditures compete with 
o ther investment projects for funds) .  Hamberg qualified this argument,
however, noting that for tax purposes R&D expenditures could be treated 
as current expenses and might not be determined by the same budgetary 
processes as f ixed investments. One other variable was included in 
the equation, namely the level of R&D employment lagged one year . 
Hamberg expected the sign of its coefficient to be positive. 
According to econometric folklore , if one can argue for 
both positive and negative signs for a single regression coefficient, 
then one should worry about a possible simultaneous equations problem . 
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Harnber g ' s  study seems to be a case in point, Consider , for example, 
the case of profits. If profits provide a source of funds for R&D 
expenditures , then this suggests a positive coefficient and also is 
consistent with the direction of causation implicit in Hambe r g ' s  
model. I f  falling profits are a s ignal to engage in more R&D, 
however, thus giving Hamber g ' s  argument for a negative coefficient, 
then this position is consistent with profits being at least in part 
determined by R&D, though possibly with some time lag. In short,  it 
seems that Hamberg is really arguing that a simultaneous equation model 
is appropriate, thereby casting considerable doubt on his results 
which were obtained by ordinary least squares. 
Hamberg was concerned with heteroscedasticity and attempted 
to correct for this by deflating by firm size. All variables which are 
measured in money units were deflated by total assets lagged one year. 
R&D employment, however, was deflated by total employment unlagged. 
Hamberg remarked that using the same deflator for all variables would 
have been desirable, but that his procedure was more meaningful 
because of the different units of measurement. Note that the method 
of deflation used does affect the interpretation of the estimated 
regression coefficient s .  
The estimating equations were of the form (the firm subscripts 
bave been omitted) ; 
Rt 
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employment in R&D 
total employment .  
after-tax profits. 
depreciation expenses. 
government research contracts, 
gross investment. 
total assets. 
time. 
Hamb erg also estimated a number of variations on this model, varying 
the lag s tructure, using sales instead of profits , and deleting the 
government contracts variables. 
Note that the use of different deflating variables makes 
the equation for R&D employment be the following: 
Rt 
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If the ratios E /A 1 and E /E 1 are not cons tant across the firms t t- t t-
in the sample, then the regression coefficients are made somewhat 
difficult to interpret. Even if these ratios are constant,  the 
relationship between current and past levels of R&D needs to be 
reinterpreted and the constant terms in the regress ions (which were 
not reported) become quite important. Suppose, for example, that 
E t/E t-l is equal to A for each f irm in the sample . Then 
Rt aAEt-l + • . .  + fARt-l + ut A (a + f)Rt-l + . . • + aA8 t-l + 
ut 
where Et 
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Rt + e t . Thus the coefficient should be the sum of the 
unreported constant term plus the estimated coefficient. For all 
these reasons Hamber g ' s  results are difficult to interpret .  
Hamb erg estimated regressions using 1960 data for samples 
of firms in eight different industries. The results were mixed. Three 
variables generally entered with negative coefficient s :  profits (four 
of five) , depreciation (six of eight) , and gross inves tment (five of 
eight) with five coefficients being significant at .05 or higher levels 
of significance. The estimated coefficients for sales, government 
contracts, and lagged R&D personnel were generally positive with 
thirteen of the nineteen estimates being significant. The model was 
estimated without the government contract variable for twenty-one 
industries with similar result s .  Hamberg concluded that liquidity 
had little influence on R&D, and if gross investment has any effec t ,  
i t  i s  negative ( o f  the thirteen significant coefficients, twelve are 
negative) . 
Mansfield (1963b; 1968 , Chapter 2) estimated logarithmic 
regressions between R&D expenditures and firm size (sales) for samples 
of firms in the chemical, petroleum, drug, steel, and glass indus tries , 
The equation estimated was: 
ln Rti = year dummies + (a + bt) ln Sti + eti) .
In all cases the estimate of a was positive and significant. With the 
exception of the steel industry, all the estimates were significantly 
different from one, the estimate being greater than one for chemicals 
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and less than one in the other indus tries. The estimates o f  b were 
not significantly different from zero, indicating that the elasticity 
of R&D expenditures with respect to firm size was constant over the 
period (19Lf5-1959) . 
Loeb and Lin (1977) reestimated the equations suggested 
by Scherer (1965b , c) Grabowski (1968) and -Hamberg (1964 ) .  They 
used data on six unnamed but " representative" pharmaceutical firms . 
Their product is differentiated methodologically by their use of 
specification error tests developed by Ramsey (1969, 1970, 1974 ) .  
Their general conclusion was that research intensity tends to diminish 
as size increases for that industry. Howe and McFetridge (1976) 
studied a sample of eighty-one Canadian firms in the electrical, 
chemical , and machinery industries over the period 1969-1971. The 
dependent variable in their study was expenditures on R&D, and the 
main independent variables were firm size (sales) , profits, depreciation, 
the Herfindahl index of the three-digit industry, and government 
incentive grants .  The equations were tested for homogeneity over time 
and heteroscedasticity was allowed for. Quite sensibly it was assumed 
that the scale of the disturbance variances varied with fi1:m size . The 
effect of firm size was not generally significant, the estimated coef­
ficients being a bit erratic. Also the Herfindahl index was statistically 
insignificant , In the chemical and machinery industries the coefficient 
of government grants was not significantly different from zero. Thus 
for these indus tries, one could not reject the hypothesis that the 
receipt of government incentive grants simply replaced R&D expenditures 
that the firms would have made, It should be pointed out that a 
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condition for receiving the grants is that matching private funds are 
spent on the R&D projects being subsidized. Nevertheless, only for 
the electrical industry is there evidence that the grants actually 
caused increased private R&D expenditures . 
Shrieves (1978) studied a sample of 411 firms . The criteria 
for being chosen was that they could be assigned to a three-digit 
industry and were included in COMPUSTAT and the 1965 edition of 
Industrial Research Laboratories of the United States. The dependent 
variable was R&D employment and the main independent variables were 
the percentage of 1965 R&D financed by the federal government ,  firm 
size (again sales ) , and the four-firm concentration ratio, The 
coefficient of the governmental subsidy variable was negative and 
significant which is consistent with the Canadian results discussed 
in the preceding paragraph. The results on size and concentration 
tend to indicate that , ceteris paribu s ,  small firms i n  concentrated 
industries do more R&D than others. The results are flawed by the 
inclusion of a number of more or less uninterpretable variables based 
on applying factor analysis to sets of characteristics of the product 
market and the technology. Factor analysis was used to reduce the 
dimensions of the explanatory variables, In this sense it was 
successful , but not surprisingly the results are hard to interpret, 
I t  is unclear why this is a preferable state to "confounding , "  that 
is , multicollinearity among known variables. 
Shrieve s '  findings on size and concentration were also 
obtained by Rosenberg (1976) using a sample of 100 of the Fortune 500. 
A firm was entered in the sample only if its primary area of production 
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was classified as high or low technology. For this study R&D was 
measured by the percentage of employment and firm size by market 
share. 
Fisher and Temin (1973) have argued that most studies of 
the relation between firm size and the level of R&D activity are 
inappropriate. They argued that these studies are at tempting to 
test the so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis (Schumpeter 1942) that 
11 there are increasing returns in R&D both to the size of the R&D 
establishment and to firm size , "  as follows : 
Let R number of workers in R&D. 
S = total number of workers in a firm. 
N = S - R. 
F(R,N) 
Hypothesis: 
the average labor productivity of R&D. 
3F > O 3R 
dF > O .3N 
The empirical literature has mainly been concerned with whether 
n §_ dR > l.R dS 
Yet the question of the impact of antitrust policy really involves 
the relation between the output of R&D and firm size. That is, 
whether 
E 
_S _ d ( R  • F) 
R • F dS 
+ S dF l ri F dS > • 
4 5  
Fisher and Temin argue that � being greater than one i s  neither
necessary nor sufficient for £ greater than 1 or for the truth of 
Schumpeter ' s  hypothesis. Thus they conclude that the empirical work 
is "of very little interest. n 
The general point made by Fisher and Temin seems sensible, 
namely, that many of the interesting questions involve the behavior 
or the output of the innovative process while , in general , all that 
is measured are the inputs. Further, though the studying of the 
relationship between firm size and R&D effort may be interesting, it 
does not bear directly on the question of increasing returns, either 
to firm size or research effort. 
In summary, the evidence suggests that firm size is positively 
related to R&D effort. Research intensity in general does not seem to 
be an increasing function of firm size at least when attention is 
restricted to the largest firms. The major exception seems to be the 
chemical industry; in most others there is evidence that research 
intensity decreases with f irm size. As Scherer noted , many small firms 
do no R&D and thus studies that deal only with large firms may bias 
the results against bigness . In particular, if there is some threshold 
size required for a firm to have a research program, these studies could 
not detect :tt. Weiss has stated that this latter problem is most 
likely of little concern from the policy point of view as antitrust 
policy generally involves only the largest f irms in an industry. 
4 6  
Concentration 
Hamberg (1966, Chapter 4) correlated total industry, 
company-financed R&D expenditures with an "average concentration 
indicator11 using 1958 data on two-digit SIC industries. The measure 
of concentration used was a weighted average of the concentration 
ratios for the relevant five-digit industries. The correlation 
was positive ( 0 . 50) and significant. A similar result was ob tained 
when industry R&D intensity was correlated with concentration 
(r = 0 . 54) . Hamberg also calculated rank correlations of 0 . 4 6  
(significant) and 0 , 36 ( insignificant) , respectively. Hamberg stated 
that he considers the rank correlat ions more accurate . He concluded 
that there is 11 too much variance in industry R&D spending left 
unexplained by industrial concentration to attach much importance 
to the latter variable as a determinant of R&D" (1966, p .  64) . 
Horowit z  (1962) computed rank correlations between several 
measures of research and four-firm concentration ratios, average 
employment , and average value added for two sets of data relating 
to two- and three-digit indus tries. He used the Niehans index in 
calculating average firm sizes. The measures of research used 
were : the percentage of firms that responded to the survey and 
had research organizations , research intensity, the percent of research 
laboratories in the largest 20 percent of the firms , and the percent 
of firms with R&D expenditures but without their own research laboratories , 
Concentration was correlated significantly with all four variables , the 
signs being plus , plus , minus , minus , respectively. Correlations 
calculated using the firm size variables were quite similar. Horowitz 
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noted that firms in highly concentrated industries are more l ikely 
to engage in research and tend to spend a higher percentage of their 
sales than firms in less concentrated industries . He concluded that 
the evidence is consistent with the hypo thesis that bigness is 
conducive to research effort. But he also stated that "it is not 
clear, however ,  whe ther the large firm in the concentrated industry 
has created ci1e research laboratory, or whether the research laboratory 
has brought about the eme rgence of the large firm and increased 
concentration" ( p .  300) . 
Scherer (1967) analyzed data on the number of scientists and 
engineers employed in f ifty-six industries in 1960 . He regressed the 
logarithm of the number of technical personnel on the logarithms of 
concentration (CR4) and total employment in the industry. The concen­
tration variable entered with a positive sign and was "highly significan t . "  
The coefficient was still positive and significant (nearly four times 
its standard error) when dummies for certain industry groups (electrical, 
chemical , traditional , re gional , durable goods , and consumer goods) 
were added. When the ratio of technical personnel to total employment 
was regressed on concentration, the results were similar though somewhat 
less favorable to the Schumpeterian hypothesis. In this linear form 
of the model , howeve r ,  the addition of the industry dummies resulted 
in substantial drop in the significance of concentration. While in 
all cases the results suggested that increasing concentration was 
associated with larger research effort (controlling for industry size ) ,  
whether o r  not the result was statistically significant depended on the 
choice of functional form. 
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Comanor (1967) studied the relationship between R&D personnel 
(both total and professional) and concentration, barriers to entry, 
and firm size. He gives the results of log-log regressions of R&D input 
on firm size (employment) for twenty-one indus tries , and in the majority 
of cases the coefficients were less than one. These estimates were then 
regressed against average firm size and CR8 with the results that
both variables were positively related to the estimates , but only firm 
size was significant. These regressions taken together suggest that 
Comanor was working with the following random coefficient model : 
where 
Rij 
s
ij 
c
j 
s
j 
ln Rij aj + bj 
ln sij + £:lj 
b j 
= c + dC j + eS j + u j , 
R&D inputs for the ith firm in the j th indus try. 
size of the ith firm in the j th indus try. 
eight-firm concentration ratio for the j th industry. 
average firm size for industry j .  
Combining these relations gives 
ln R . .'J aj + c ln S ij + dCj ln S ij + eSj ln S ij + uj ln S ij + £ij
. 
Comanor' s two-step procedure while inefficient does yield 
unbiased estimates of the parameters a . ,  c,  d, and e. However ,  there J 
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is a heteroscedasticity problem at the second step so that statements 
as to which variables are statistically significant are suspect .  
where 
Comanor also estimated the following regression: 
R ""' a + b • C + cD + dC • D + eE1 + fE2 and u ,
R 
c 
D 
El 
E2 
average number of research personnel (adjusted 
for firm size) . 
1 if CR8 exceeds 70. 
1 for consumer nondurables and material inputs. 
1 if technical entry barriers are "moderate .11 
1 if technical entry barriers are "high . "  
Comanor found that research levels tended t o  be higher in 
the indus tries classified as having moderate entry barriers and , 
ceteris paribus , in consumer durables and investment goods . He 
interpreted this as the effects of higher degrees of product differen-
tiation. It appeared that research staffs were larger in the highly 
concentrated industries though the effects were small for consumer 
durables and investment goods. The dependent variable for this 
regression was obtained from the double logarithmic regressions 
mentioned above, evaluated at " typical" firm sizes. 
Williamson (1965) used data from Mansfield (1963b; 1968 , 
Chapter 5) to examine the relatio.nship between the proportion of 
important innovations introduced by the four largest firms and concen-
tration in the steel, petroleum, and coal industries. He fit logarithmic 
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and linear regressions between the P/C and C where P is the percent 
of innovati.ons introduced by the four largest firms , and C is the percent 
of industry capacity held by the largest four firms . The results 
indicated that the largest four firms would co11tribute more than 
proportionately to innovation only at relatively low levels of concen­
tration. Williamson split the data into two subperiods (1919-1938 and 
1939-1958) to test the s tability of the regression equations and 
concluded that the relations had not shifted over time. The entire 
sample consisted of six observations (thus the last mentioned regressions 
had one degree of freedom each ) , and Williamson was appropriately cautious 
in his interpretation. 
Leonard (1971) argued the case that R&D expenditures influence 
the subsequent growth of an industry. He reported correlations between 
R&D intensity (1957-1959) and subsequent rates of growth of sales for 
sixteen industry groups and found high positive correlations between 
R&D and growth during the following five years. He also found quite 
low correlations between company financed R&D as a proportion of sales 
and previous sales growth. Using the proportion of company financed 
research personnel in total employment as a measure gave similar results , 
Leonard presented a good deal of other evidence to support his hypothesis,  
but collinearity generally made it difficult to distinguish between the 
variables. For example, R&D intensity was highly correlated with 
growth of capital stock. 
Tilton (1973) claimed that the causation went the other way . 
To support his claim, Tilton correlated earlier sales growth with 
Leonard's  measures of R&D input using total inputs rather than just 
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company financed R&D. In reply Leonard claimed that Tilton ' s  data 
were suspect ,  and redid the calculations using data that he considered 
to be better. The results are correlations intermediate between 
Tilton ' s  and Leonard ' s  original calculations (though significant at 
the • OS level) . 
Wilson (1977) studied a sample of 350 manufacturing firms 
which reported both royalty payments and R&D spending in 1971 . Wilson 
finds both R&D intensity and royalties as a fraction of sales decrease 
with concentration (four-firm concentration ratio) and increase with 
profits as a fraction of sales. Wilson ' s  results are suspect ,  however , 
as included among the explanatory variables is a possibly ordinal 
variable constructed by the author to measure the 11 ' multidimensionality' 
of the industries' product . "  For a discussion of the difficulties that 
use of non interval-level data in simple regressions present , see 
Grether (1974, 1976) . 
Overall it appears that concentration is positively related 
to R&D, though the evidence on this is not overwhelming. Further , there 
does not seem to be general agreement as to the proper interpretation 
of any such relationship . In other words , even if one believes that 
the association between concentration and research intensity is 
established, one cannot conclude that concentration caused the increase 
in R&D. Minasian (1962) concluded that R&D expenditures explain 
productivity increases as well as the level and rate of growth of 
profitability. He considered the. alternative hypothesis that profitability 
determines R&D, but for his data (a sample of nineteen chemical firms) 
he rejected this hypothesis. Als o ,  Comanor (1965) , Hamberg (1966) , and 
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Leonard (1973) assume that R&D influences growth of firms and industries 
while Grabowski (1968) , Hamberg (1966) , and Tilton (1973) assume that 
growth and profitability at least partially determine R&D. In fac t ,  
both Tilton and Leonard seem to agree that there could b e  mutual 
interdependence. 
In conclusion it seems that there are good reasons for
arguing that simultaneous equations models are more appropriate 
than the single equation approach that has generally been used. It 
should be apparent from the preceding discussion, however, that 
research workers are well aware of the problems of interdependenc e .  
In other words , the problem i s  not simply one of choosing the correct 
statistical procedure. One needs both more fully developed theoretical 
models (Montgomery and Quirk 1974) and better data (Grabowski and 
Mueller 1970). One hopes that much future research in this area 
will be based upon explicit models of firm behavior. At the least 
this should allow for a clear distinc tion between endogenous and 
exogenous or predetermined variables. Thus hopefully one can avoid 
s tudies o f  the "effects" of diversification, d1:!bt-equity structures , 
or other endogenous variables on the "productivity" of R&D expendi tures . 
It should be noted, however, that some of the best and most 
interesting work in this area has been largely descriptive, for example ,  
Schere r ' s  work on patent statis tics, and there is still room for a good 
deal of exploratory empirical work. We may not need more s tudies of,  
say, R&D expenditures of two-digit industry groups, but relatively 
little is known about the breakdown of these efforts between development 
and various types of research activities at any level of aggregation. 
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Also, even at the firm level , aggregation problems may obscure the 
interpretations of seemingly straightforward relations. For instance ,  
a s  Scherer and Grabowski have pointed out, the tendency for large 
firms to be diversified makes it difficult to interpret the correlation 
(or lack of it)  between firm size and R&D. In addition, if hypotheses 
concerning more detailed aspects of market structure or organizational 
structure of firms are to be examined, studies of specific firms, 
industries or innovations could be important: for instanc e, comparisons 
of two industries with similar market structures (reputations for 
technical progress) ,  but different records of productivity gains 
(market s tructure) . 
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